



National Commission on the Future of the Army

2530 Crystal Drive, Zachary Taylor Building, Suite 5000
Arlington, VA 22202

SUBJECT: National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) Discussion with GEN (R) Charles H. Jacoby Jr., 24 September 2015, Minutes

Date: 24 Sept 2015

Time: 1245-1345 hours

Location: Room 3E407, Pentagon, Washington DC 20310

Format: Round table unclassified discussion

Attendees:

HON Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Commissioner

GEN (R) James D. Thurman, Commissioner

GEN (R) Charles H. Jacoby Jr.

Mr. Rickey Smith, NCFA Staff Director

Mr. Don Tison, Commission Designated Federal Official (DFO)

MAJ Vinson Morris, Assistant DFO

Mr. Scott Sharp, NCFA Staff Member

Meeting Summary

Commissioners met with retired Army General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., former US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander to discuss his perspectives on the future operational environment, homeland defense operations, and how the Army meets operational requirements. The meeting started at 12:45 p.m. with opening remarks from the DFO explaining how the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applies to NCFA activities.

GEN (R) Jacoby asked to make a few opening comments before answering directed questions. The following are points from the discussion:

- As the Multi-National Corp Iraq Commander, he had over 35,000 guardsmen under his command and they are an important key component of the force. As the MNC-I Commander, Army National Guard units occasionally had difficulties at the company level, experiencing different levels of success and risk.
- The Army often says its mission is to fight and win the nations wars. His opinion is that this misses the point that the Army provides forces for Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to

fight those forces. The mission of the Army is to provide the land force to COCOMs for inclusion in an artful way to accomplish the Nation's strategic objectives. Forces able to conduct joint operations and qualities to conduct multiple phase/multiple year campaigns are key components in the Army of the future. The Army must more fully embrace joint operations.

- The Army is allowing themselves not to be a part of the deterrence conversation. If the US is willing to fight in a given part of the world, we should be willing to forward deploy ground forces there. Currently, the US appears to not embrace land forces as part of the deterrence conversation. As the Army moves forces back to the US from around the world, we are getting to a point where the US no longer picks our fight...others are picking them with the US. The world is telling the US to retain an Army big enough to deter forward and fight the first year of a major campaign without additional forces. A Regular Army of 420,000 is insufficient to fight a multi-phase multi-year campaign.
- The National Guard receives equipment (e.g. tanks or aircraft) and funding to do a Federal mission. That mission must be performed to a standard when needed. The associated funding (called Title 32) is designed to generate readiness in these formations and should not be used for any other purpose. The National Guard generally has two influences pulling at the size of the force. How big the Governor wants the force to be and the size the Army needs; these are not always synchronized. The National Guard provides the ability to expand the Army and that provides our Nation's unique competitive advantage. The Army needs to keep every National Guard brigade we can, but add readiness for these forces later; you cannot afford both. However, every National Guard unit needs a pathway to readiness and cannot stay forever at a low level of readiness. America can expand the Army more readily than the Navy or Air Force. The National Guard provides the foundation for that expansion; they are the Nation's strategic hedge to size the Army.
- When asked as a former NORTHCOM Commander if the Dual Status Commander (DSC) construct is confusing, he responded no. The challenge with DSCs is Army leaders are not educated on DSC. The desired outcome for DSC is in the best interests of all the stakeholders to "act like unity of command." A Dual Status Commander is fine for unity of effort and key to enable the Commander NORTHCOM to "reconcile the will of the President with the authorities of the Governors." The National Guard serves as a check on federal authority and the Army provides a check on the National Guard. The current friction is solvable; it only requires familiarity and respect between Governors, the National Guard, and the Active Army.
- Five key points to take away:

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1. The Army must do a better job communicating its nature as a critical component of the Joint Force.
 2. Jointness is the most critical component of the Army and the Nation's competitive advantage.
 3. The Army's mission is not to win the Nation's wars; its mission is to provide the ground force to the Joint Force.
 4. The Army needs to be deployable, not expeditionary. The USMC is expeditionary.
 5. The Army must be expandable; the National Guard provides the ability to expand the Army.
- Commissioner Hicks asked for Jacoby's assessment on future Army missions.
 1. Deploy and sustain a Campaign (multi-year/multi-phase).
 2. Integrated Air Missile Defense is crucial.
 3. Mission analysis and the ability to integrate capabilities to conduct campaigns.
 4. Lasting deterrence where our adversaries know the US has the capability for regime change.
 - On rotational forces, we have to be careful when and how we rotate. The current concept is too expensive.
 - The Army often confuses expeditionary and deployable. The Marine Corps is expeditionary, the Army has to be deployable. Army forces should be regionally focused and globally available.
 - GEN (R) Jacoby ended the discussion by recommending some of the direct combat force be moved back into the US Army Reserve. The President has to have the flexibility to mobilize some of these types of forces without having to work through a Governor.

The meeting adjourned at 1345 hours.